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Small-scale Commodity Frontiers: The Bioeconomy Value Chain of Castor Oil in 
Madagascar  
The European Commission defines the bioeconomy as a ‘transition economy which 
seeks to increase efficiency, optimize use and decrease environmental impact through 
the reduction of waste and greenhouse gas emissions.’ However, attempts to 
substitute or control nature through efficient bio-based technology have not lived up 
to expectations and much of the industry still relies on globally sourced biomass to 
drive the bioeconomy. This article examines the social and political economic 
relations surrounding small-scale production of the feedstock castor oil plant (castor, 
Ricinus communis) in the deep-south of Madagascar. Theorizing the bioeconomy 
through the lens of a ‘small-scale commodity frontier’, it builds from recent 
injunctions by Jason Moore to show how the appropriation of cheap nature 
(including paid and unpaid labour) is both historically and geographically co-
produced. The castor value chain is held up as a way to transform regional 
economies and a ‘silver bullet’ to alleviate poverty and food security in some of the 
most economically marginal areas of Madagascar. We adopt a reginal and feminist 
political ecology approach to illustrate what is behind this discursive cloak of 
‘development imaginaries’, making visible the social relations surrounding castor 
production and demonstrating the historical marginalization involved in producing 
the frontier.  
The bioeconomy is one of the oldest economic sectors known to humanity, and 
the life sciences and biotechnology are transforming it into one of the newest 
European Commission 2005, 2; quoted in Birch and 
Tyfield 2013  






‘The bioeconomy starts here!’1 This is the title of an animated video promoting the European 
Commission bioeconomy initiative touting ‘inclusive sustainable development’ through the 
rise of an economy founded on manufacturing in biotechnology laboratories in Europe. The 
European Commission defines the bioeconomy, as a ‘transition economy which seeks to 
increase efficiency, optimize use and decrease environmental impact through the reduction of 
waste and greenhouse gas emissions.’2 Key to the bioeconomy’s success, argue its 
proponents, is the adoption of ‘knowledge-based’ biotechnology (i.e. technoscience). This 
has the capacity to increase the accessibility of sustainable biomass on an industrial scale, 
including flexi-crops (crops with dual purposes, such as fuel and food) and, through 
conversion using innovations such as GM microbial enzymes and advanced bio-refineries, 
low-cost non-edible feedstock (Borras et al. 2016).3 In theory, biotech’s coupling of ‘genetic 
and bio-molecular science’ in the ‘intensification of natural productivity for commercial 
exploitation’ promises to deliver a portfolio of bio-innovations, including alternative forms of 
energy (e.g. biofuels), intermediate inputs (e.g. biochemicals), and natural products (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, bioplastics) (Birch et al. 2010, 2899; see also Birch et al. 2010; Levidow 
2011).  
Yet up to this point, biotechnology’s attempts to control or ‘engineer’ nature within 
laboratories in Europe have not lived up to expectations and much of the industry still relies 
on globally sourced and resource-intensive biomass to fuel the bioeconomy (McMichael 
                                                          
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/news/bioeconomy-video-spreads-word 
[accessed on 2 November 2015]. 
2 See http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/policy/bioeconomy_en.htm [accessed on 1 November 
2015]. 
3 There are a number of crops which can be identified as flexi-crops; the main ones are soybean, 
sugarcane and palm oil.  




2012).4 In the past few years, increasing demand for massive amounts of low-cost feedstock 
has caused socio-economic conflict over land and environmental degradation throughout the 
global south (Carmody 2011; McMichael 2009; 2012).5 Many of these effects, from the 
dispossession of farmers due to large-scale land acquisitions, or ‘land-grabbing’, to rainforest 
clearing and increased competition with food crops, have been widely documented (Borras et 
al. 2010, 2012; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; White and Dasgupta 2010). In response, there 
have been attempts to reform production by implementing new sustainable certification 
schemes (Bailis and Baka 2011; Ponte and Birch 2014), fairer labour practices (Garvey et al. 
2015), and land tenure guidelines for foreign investment (Fairbairn 2015; World Bank 2010). 
Many of these, however, have either not been fully adopted or made little impact within rural 
sites of production.  
While scholarly work on the bioeconomy is beginning to appear, the majority has been 
largely theoretical, focusing mainly on the role of technoscience and structural flows of 
capital and financialization of the biotech industry (Birch and Tyfield 2013; Birch et al. 2010; 
Levidow 2011). Although there is certainly value in framing the bioeconomy as a concept of 
high-modernism and within a very particular etymological relation to capitalism, we also see 
the importance of understanding it as ‘lived practice’, where material implications of biomass 
sourcing on small-scale outgrowers (also known as contract farmers) are observed through a 
historical lens of socio-economic and political marginalization (Borras and Franco 2011; Oya 
2012). 6  
                                                          
4 Biomass is the generic term for resource inputs in the form of oil-seed and soybean feedstock, blue-
green algae, and ligno-cellulosic and crop residues which through chemical processes create a host of 
products and services. 
5 This demand was driven by two alternative energy policies, the EU Alternative Energy Mandate and 
the US EP Act 2005 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), as well as new bioeconomy initiatives 
promoted by the OCSD and EU. 
6 Small-scale production is defined as production from 1–10 ha. While the focus in this paper is castor 
oil, there is also parallel production of Jatropha sp. integrated in this chain.  




Although significant debates exist on their significance as compared to larger commercial 
production systems using plantations, outgrowers, to variable degrees depending on crop and 
commodity-specificity, have been a mainstay of agricultural production systems in sub-
Saharan Africa (Cotula et al. 2009; Watts 1994).7 Nevertheless, the adoption of outgrowers 
for bioeconomy projects seem to be on the rise and with mixed outcomes (Alonso-Fradejas 
2012; Gerber and Veuthey 2010; Guereña and Zepeda 2013). This is particularly the case in 
Madagascar, where firms and their development partners see outgrowers as an alternative to 
the high-profile cases of large-scale land acquisitions that have plagued the country since the 
Daewoo land deal and subsequent political crisis of 2008–9 (Burnod et al. 2015). While 
outgrowers more generally do not experience dispossession in the same way as observed with 
large-scale acquisitions and plantation-style production systems, as we see below, their 
experiences of marginalization and exploitation exhibit similar, albeit subtler, forms of 
violence to that of forced evictions (Li 2011; Borras and Franco 2011, see also Kelly 2011) 8  
The aim of this article is to examine the social and political economic relations surrounding 
the value chain of the castor oil plant (Ricinus communis) run by a Franco-Malagasy bio-oil 
firm in the deep-south of Madagascar. Castor has been produced in Madagascar for use in the 
pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries since colonial times. More recently, the plant, 
alongside other key crops (i.e. jatropha, soybean, switch grass and now flexi-crops), have at 
varying times and with different degrees of success, been held up by development agencies as 
a so-called ‘silver-bullet’ commodity which, they argue, through a ‘value-chain approach’, 
can alleviate poverty and address food security in some of the most economically marginal 
                                                          
7 See Oya (2012, 14) for an extensive review of the purported role, significance and methodological 
deficiencies in systematic calculations of contract farming in sub-Saharan Africa. There is also 
methodological challenge of case studies, including florists in Kenya and horticulturalists in Senegal, 
which on the surface seem to be small-scale but feed into larger commercial production systems.  
8 What Kelly (2011) calls ‘veiled’ accumulation or the deliberate attempt to mask the violent acts of 
dispossession over long periods of time.  




regions of Madagascar.9 Development agencies have tied their hopes on such commodity 
crops to fuel particular ‘sustainable development imaginaries’ – ‘the self-conscious making 
of a spectacle’ (Tsing 2000, 118) – used to entice foreign investment and direct favourable 
policies which promote the use of global markets to address some of the most difficult 
problems facing rural inhabitants. Yet, as Borras et al. (2016) and others (Hunsberger and 
Alonso-Fradejas 2016; Neimark 2016) note, the performance of such discursive and 
fetishized ‘bioeconomy imaginaries’ has consequences way beyond their intended purpose, 
exposing many at the rural level to come head-on with the risks of global capital. Following 
Marx’s oft-cited quote that the ‘…fetishism of commodities has its origin … in the peculiar 
social character of the labour that produces them’ (Marx and Engels 1970, 77), we critically 
examine what is behind this fetishism of the bioeconomy to render visible the hidden material 
relations (labour mobilization, gender relations) and social costs surrounding castor 
production. Elucidating labour relations in biomass production helps identify the 
bioeconomy’s ‘origins’ across space and time – not within the ‘bundles of innovations’ in 
European biotech laboratories as alluded to in the European Commission’s promotional 
video, but on the backs of labourers in the deep-south of Madagascar.10  
Although today Madagascar represents just a fraction of total global production, we 
demonstrate the great lengths (and distances) that firms and large development agencies, such 
as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Community in 
partnership with the German Development Agency (GIZ), are willing to go to source biomass 
and bring Malagasy labour within the circulation of capital (see below for further description 
of agencies). Results show that for benefits in the form of merger cash payments for castor 
                                                          
9 See van Eeckhout 2015. This is a historical pattern of silver-bullet development crops, from the 
agroforesty wonder tree Leucaena sp., to neem and the current slew of flex or biofuel crops (Borras et 
al. 2016). 
10 This is analogous to Marley’s (2016) comment about the emergence of capitalism emanating not 
from the textile smokestacks of the nineteenth century industrial revolution, but from the long 
sixteenth and seventeenth century slave labour of the Americas and Caribbean. 




seeds, outgrowers take on the extra work of transporting the seeds long distances and the 
additional risks of production (crop failure due to drought or disease), all in the name of 
poverty reduction and sustainable development. We provide a critical window into how and 
why a small-scale bioeconomy frontier develops and paradoxically how attempts to bring a 
precarious labour force into the circulation of capital relations are placing the most vulnerable 
face-to-face with the variants of global capitalism (Polanyi ([1944] 2001).  
This paper makes an original contribution to Jason Moore’s (2015) theoretical framework of 
‘commodity frontiers’ by applying it to the bioeconomy. Building on recent injunctions by 
Campling (2012) and others (Marley 2016; Saguin 2015), we use a ‘small-scale bioeconomy 
frontier’ to show how the bioeconomy industry − itself in a contemporary crisis of over-
accumulation within a carbon-constrained economy – is unable to source biomass in bulk 
and/or deliver the knowledge-based innovations needed to replace it altogether. Under such 
conditions of potential diminishing returns, the industry expands spatially to new areas across 
the globe where it can source low-cost feedstock (both in new forms of biomass, such as 
flexi-crops, and older historical colonial crops, such as castor) in order to continue 
accumulation.11  
Following Saguin, we show that agrarian change in the bioeconomy is still essentially an 
‘ecological agrarian question’ which Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010, 269) argue ‘…must 
critically investigate the character of ecological relationships … and in so doing address 
contradictions of class and ecology if it is going to explain social change in contemporary 
rural settings’ (2010, 269). The bioeconomy is fraught with socio-technical and political 
economic contradictions and crises whereas the ‘rural production process’ must continually 
                                                          
11 Moore’s (2015, 9) post-Cartesian ‘world ecology’ approach extends this dialectical relationship 
between society and nature, attempting a unification of humanity and nature through a ‘web of life’ 
perspective which sees human and extra-human nature through a lens of capital accumulation. 
However, Campling (2012), Saguin (2016) and to some degree Marley 2016 tend at times to hold on 
to the classic nature–society dialectics). 




contend with the limits of ‘agroecological resources, whether monetarily costed or non-
costed’, and which ‘contribute to or constrain the process of accumulation’ (Akram-Lodhi 
and Kay 2010, 269). As Saguin notes, ‘[t]he production of commodity frontiers is a process 
enacted through ecological revolutions wherein capital appropriates ecological surpluses – 
cheap labour, food, energy and inputs – at a low cost by mobilizing labour power and extra-
human nature’ (2015, 2). We highlight and differentiate the spatial-temporal cycle of opening 
up or widening and intensifying or deepening engagement with nature of the small-scale 
bioeconomy industry, which facilitates the appropriation of previously non-commodified 
resources (due to exhaustion of stocks and socio-technical constraints) and a greater 
exploitation of paid labour and appropriation of unpaid labour (household reproduction, 
transporting and sourcing of semi-wild crops which nature provides ‘free of charge’).12 This  
This paper proceeds in five sections. First, we lay out an overview of Jason Moore’s theory of 
commodity frontiers and its relationship to other studies examining similar work around the 
agrarian question. We address how the concept relates to the material relations surrounding 
the bioeconomy and agrarian change. In the second section, we provide a historical-
geographical background to castor production in Madagascar, from the colonial period to the 
contemporary quest to seek out new production. The paper departs from recent scholarship’s 
sectoral and world systems approach to understanding commodity frontiers (Campling 2012; 
Moore 2015). Rather, our empirical analysis draws on the unique perspectives of harvesters, 
traders, mid-level managers and firm operators of castor production. We adopt both a 
regional and to some degree a feminist political ecology approach to critically understand the 
                                                          
12 As Moore (2015) notes, ‘the accumulation of capital unfolds at the nexus of paid work (performed 
by some humans) and unpaid work (performed by most humans, and all extra-human natures).’ The 
former is exploitative wage labour and the latter includes hidden labour which is performed in the 
service of capitalism (household labour, animals, labour of ecosystem services, etc.). See 
https://jasonwmoore.wordpress.com/2014/04/25/beyond-the-exploitation-of-nature-a-world-
ecological-alternative/ [accessed on 18 November 2016]. 
 




material relations of the castor value chain embedded in its distinctive geo-historical and 
political economic landscape of marginalization (Blaikie 1985; Broch-Due and Schroeder 
2000; McKinnon and Hiner 2016; Neumann 2005; Rocheleau et al. 1997; Schroeder 1999). 
We conclude by discussing the implications of viewing the bioeconomy through the lens of a 
commodity frontier and opportunities and shortcomings of using this lens in the application 
of a case study of small-scale growers. 
Methodological Considerations 
This work builds from data collected in June and July in 2012 and 2014, respectively; this 
ethnographic fieldwork consists of over 120 semi-structured interviews and socio-economic 
surveys with harvesters of castor and farmers of other crops, as well as key interviews with 
heads of village associations, representatives of the castor processing firm and development 
NGOs in the deep-southern regions of Anosy and Androy in Madagascar.13  
The interviews focused on a regional Franco-Malagasy agricultural export firm, which has 
been in operation since 2009 and is one of a few companies which have attempted to revive 
castor production from its colonial past. We follow the production system chain to highlight 
the perspectives of people who are involved in growing and wild collection of castor for the 
bio-oil firm, as well as exporting it for European buyers who purchase the pressed oil in bulk 
for the manufacture of bioplastics, biofuels and the cosmetics industry.14 Subjects were 
chosen because of their close relationship to the firm as employees, family members of 
contract workers, or non-growers living in villages where the firm operates. 
                                                          
13 These are two of the 22 regions of Madagascar which since 2009 have become ‘first-level’ 
administrative divisions and sit in the District of Amboasary-Atsimo (second-level). These two 
regions have a population of roughly 1.5 million inhabiting an area of 45,200 km2. The majority of 
these are subsistence farmers living on customary tenure plots of roughly 1.3 ha (FAO 2016). 
14 Interview with regional manager [7 July 2014]. 




The firm’s financial and logistical support is provided by a larger private–public initiative, 
the Food Security Improvement and Increased Agricultural Income Programme (ASARA), 
funded by the European Commission’s Development Fund (GIZ 2014) and UNDP, and in 
partnership with GIZ, the German NGO.15 ASARA’s main objectives are to address food 
insecurity through the incorporation of vulnerable households into sustainable development 
based on export-intensive agricultural commodities. The castor firm is private but has been 
financially supported and provided with technical equipment by ASARA; logistical support 
has also been provided by GIZ. As with many agricultural projects in southern Madagascar, 
there is little financial or technical support provided by Malagasy state agencies. Interviews 
included members of many of these civil society groups involved in this project. 
THEORETICAL POSITIONING  
Recently, the concept of ‘commodity frontiers’ has emerged as a novel way to trace socio-
ecological shifts and nested contradictions that are inherent in capitalism and its relationship 
to nature (Foster and Clark 2009; Marley 2016; Moore 2000, 2010, 2015; O’Connor 1998). 
Specifically, the theory of commodity frontiers looks at socio-ecological processes using a 
‘world ecology’ approach, illustrating both exploitation of paid labour power and 
appropriation of unpaid work (performed by most humans, and all extra-human natures – 
nature’s free gifts) (Araghi 2009; Moore 2010, 2015). While these various theories help in the 
understanding of how ‘value chains’ form, for us, the concept of a small-scale commodity 
frontier links up the historical and regional specificity – the vertical and horizontal relations 
amongst firms involved in production and consumption of castor oil used for the bioeconomy 
(Campling 2012, 225; see also Moore 2015).  
                                                          
15 GIZ is the successor NGO to what was previously called GTZ – a development arm of the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) operating in public–private 
partnerships in rural and urban development in Madagascar since 1982. 




So what does it mean to call the bioeconomy a ‘commodity frontier?’ Commenting on the use 
of ‘frontier’, the environmental anthropologist David Hughes notes: ‘The term frontier means 
two things, both of them strikingly political … The frontier is a zone, a hinterland, lying 
outside the spatial core of a society but within grasp … yet they also bound and demarcate 
national, sovereign territories … the same frontier can both permit and circumscribe 
conquest, even at the same time’ (2011, 3). This study of the bioeconomy unveils the uneven 
landscape of labour relations around the small-scale sourcing of castor oil within some of the 
most historically marginalized rural producers in Madagascar. Moving beyond a geo-
historical and sector-dominated analysis found in recent commodity frontier work, it espouses 
a regional and feminist political ecology approach which, first, highlights the distinction of 
regional socio-ecological politics (Blaikie 1985; Neumann 2005; Walker 2003) and, second, 
highlights regional discursive formations (Peet and Watts 2002, 16) that ‘originate in, and 
display the effects of, certain physical, political-economic, and institutional settings. 
Furthermore, by integrating feminist political ecology we make a key point in highlighting 
gender as a crucial variable in constituting access and control of resources and unevenness of 
value-chain development (Harcourt and Nelson 2015; Rocheleau et al. 1997; Schroeder 
1999). We argue that although there are strands of both feminist and regional political 
ecology embedded in the commodity frontier concept, their adoption by scholars as an 
analytical lens is often less observed. Results show how the ecological particularities of 
castor – that it grows and can be accessed by women in semi-wild areas – engenders a 
particular division of labour. This paradoxically both empowers women collectors while also 
placing burdens on them to transport it very long distances for little or no pay.  
Rather than simply accepting bioeconomy ‘frontiers’ as being part of a concept of abstract 
space waiting to be enclosed and commodified, we follow Peet and Watts (2002, 16), who 
examine the ‘power-saturated interactions and interchanges’ with marginalized groups 




immersed in discursive formations and articulations about value-chain development. It is 
through the lens of a small-scale commodity frontier that we are able see the lived 
bioeconomy of castor, which is rooted within a complex history of marginalized populations, 
discursively and materially produced in a certain way for the reproduction of capital (Borras 
et al. 2016; Campling 2012; Ribot 1998).  
This bundle of abstract social and material relations links up to the real, anticipated or 
speculative and imagined narratives put forth by Borras et al. (2012, 105) which helps explain 
the complexity of layered promotion of commodity flex-crops and the extensive social 
implications of discursive narratives even in the absence of the commodity ever 
materializing. Much like the flex-crop narrative, the regional development narrative pushed 
forth under castor oil value chains is an example of the bioeconomy responding to the social 
and environmental crisis of over-accumulation.  
While the commodity frontier framework draws heavily from world-systems, its approach to 
long histories is distinct in how it views resources and ecological change (Moore 2010). 
Rather than something that acts negatively upon nature, the concept highlights the 
‘appropriation of nature for the production of commodities for exchange’ (Campling 2012, 
225, emphasis in original) where ‘relatively durable patterns of governance (formal and 
informal), technological innovations, class structures, and organizational forms that have 
sustained and propelled successive phases’ extend accumulation (Moore 2015, 158; see also 
Araghi 2009). In this sense, the small-scale bioeconomy frontier ‘is not merely just a system 
of unpaid costs (known as “externalities”), it is a system of unpaid work (“invisibilities”)’ 
(Moore 2015, 64).  
Thus, for us, the small-scale bioeconomy frontier not only extends and deepens human and 
extra-human nature into areas such as southern Madagascar which are relatively unknown to 
capital, but also opens up new possibilities for entering zones of ‘appropriation of high 




ecological surplus’ (Campling 2012, 256). Yet, as we argue, such ‘possibilities’ of frontier 
formation do not appear randomly nor are they abstractions constructed within development 
imaginaries (food security, income generation), but are produced over long historical periods 
of marginalization and uneven development (see Broch-Due and Schroeder 2000).  
The Bioeconomy and the Ecological Agrarian Question 
At one level, the ecological agrarian question remains as relevant in the bioeconomy as it 
once did to nineteenth century thinkers, who first described the phenomenon of the 
‘persistence’ and ‘self-exploitation’ of the ‘family’ or small-scale producer (cf. Akram-Lodhi 
and Kay 2010). For Bernstein (2010, 94) and others (Kautsky 1988; Mann and Dickinson 
1978) the persistence, or staying-power, of the small-scale farmer is ‘tolerated’ and even 
‘encouraged’ by capital mainly because farmers will subsidize their costs by growing their 
own food and providing labour power (wages). In other words, small-scale producers can be 
paid less because the wage does not have to cover household-based ‘social reproduction’, 
which is taken care of by the farmers themselves (Bernstein 2010, 94). The recent ‘greening’ 
discourse relating to the bioeconomy has opened new pathways for rethinking the agrarian 
question once again as new spaces of cheap nature in the global south are appropriated for 
green ends or ‘green grabbing’ (Fairhead et al. 2012) and as noted above, framed under 
‘inclusive’ economic and social development.  
Critical scholars have shown how market-driven development capital allows for both 
widening and deepening capitalist penetration into the rural countryside (de Janvry 1981). 
However, less scholarly attention has been paid to seeing the bioeconomy as a commodity 
frontier and in particular the material consequences as the search for new biomass enters a 
new temporal phase of global expansion. We see this as a significant departure from previous 
work and how values are captured in forms of un-commodified nature (Neimark et al. 2016). 
Unlike most studies, which take an approach which considers commodity production to be 




place-specific, biomass production is highly transitory, mobile and flexible. The ‘small-scale’ 
bioeconomy commodity frontier tends to develop in places where a commodity can be 
produced under minimum capitalization,16 but where private sector firms, NGOs and their 
development funders see large amounts of cheap land, labour and resources ripe for 
commodification (Moore 2015; see also Campling 2012; Saguin 2015). This case of a small-
scale bioeconomy commodity frontier is one where expansion dynamics are largely defined 
by cheap capitalization − as capital is not available to small-scale producers of speciality 
crops where biomass, once a colonial crop, is now being re-appropriated for a range of new 
uses – from fuels to industrial products. One way this is possible is for capital to make the 
risks of commodity production low through a host of ‘invisible’ intrinsic costs (i.e. cheap 
food, household labour and transport of wild castor) and risks (crop failure) that rural 
producers will take on for little benefit.  
This becomes operationalized through an adoption of development discourse surrounding 
‘value chains’, which funders of small-scale bioeconomy projects have instituted in order to 
secure global biomass ‘yield gaps’ and keep as much of the upstream transformation and 
processing activities ‘in country’, thereby increasing market share in the commodity (Richer 
2015).17 Counter to applied empirical uses of the terms (cf. Gibbon and Ponte 2005), ‘value 
chain’, and others such as ‘upgrading’, are in themselves discursive constructions providing 
cover for firms to continue to widen spatial access. A value chain, as McMichael (2013, 627) 
aptly remarks, ‘…is represented as a benign facilitator of agricultural productivity and rural 
                                                          
16 This is in contrast to high capitalization costs such as increased need for inputs, mechanization and 
transport of raw materials. It is also dissimilar to other parts of the bioeconomy, such as palm oil, 
corn, soybean, sugarcane and tree-based production mills, which require new, massive biorefineries 
built close to plantation areas; certification schemes, such as the roundtable for sustainable biofuels 
and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) also require capitalization in the form of scientific and 
technical expertise (Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2016). 
17 For more specific work on value chains and especially analytical frameworks for buyer-driven 
chains see Gibbon and Ponte (2005). We recognize that ‘funders’ of projects are a diverse array of 
actors including civil society, multinationals, medium and small companies, bi-/multi-lateral and state 
aid agencies which to differing degrees pick up on bioeconomy discourse in different ways (see 
Hunsberger and Alonso-Fradejas 2016).  




income, its power relations are explicit in the term itself’ articulating the capacity ‘to 
appropriate the unpaid work of nature (including humans), coupled with the exploitation of 
cheap labour’ (Marley 2016, 4).  
Seeing the bioeconomy as a commodity frontier also provides a window into the intersections 
of socio-technological engagement with nature and how ecological constraints open up 
opportunities for capital to deepen commodification (Campling 2012; Castree 2004). The role 
of technology in mediating productive practices has been observed by scholars looking at the 
effects of new and emerging science and capitalism in agriculture (Goodman and Redclift, 
1991). Goodman and Redclift (1991) and Goodman et al. (1987) provide the key concepts of 
‘appropriationism’ and ‘substitutionism’ to express ways that agricultural capitalists 
overcome the natural barriers in agriculture or at least reduce the effects of these temporal 
disruptions in the realization of capitalist profits. They use appropriationism to express 
innovations made to reduce the effects of natural cycles, thereby facilitating the accumulation 
of capital.  
Continuing this line of thinking, the bioeconomy is also attempting substitutionism of its own 
terms. While the original conceptualization of substitutionism refers to the complete 
replacement of ‘natural’ products altogether, the bioeconomy can be seen as a way for the 
biotech industry to reverse the process and replace the inorganic with the organic, bringing 
with it a host of hitherto non-commodified resources into the circulation of capital (Goodman 
et al., 1987; see also Goodman and Redclift 1991). An example of substitutionism in this way 
includes the adoption of natural fibres to replace synthetic fibres, or in the case of 
bioprospecting the use of natural bioactive chemical compounds which can replace 
synthesized drugs. Yet as we demonstrate, the inability of capital to completely manipulate 
the factors and relations of the bioeconomy through new innovations has become a key 
constraint in successfully being able to disengage from nature, and therefore the industry 




must still contend with accumulating cheap biomass from large-scale plantations and small-
scale outgrowing systems. 
REGIONAL POLITICAL ECOLOGY: COLONIAL TO PRESENT-DAY CASTOR 
PRODUCTION  
While development agencies’ efforts are by no means exclusive to southern Madagascar, the 
direct targeting of the population for poverty alleviation and food security is for good reason. 
Madagascar’s rank in the UN Human Development Index (HDI) is 154 (out of 188) with over 
87.7 per cent of its population of 23.6 million living below the income poverty line of $1.25 
per day.18 Androy and Anosy consistently have some of the highest rates of poverty and 
populations are ranked as the most ‘at risk’ of chronic malnutrition and food security. 19 The 
region is home to a mosaic of subsistence farmers and production systems, including pastoral 
nomads, irrigated rice, maize and cassava, and fishing. These mainly subsistence farmers 
manage their livelihoods, which includes both simple or ‘petty’ commodity production of 
some basic surplus under cycles of consecutive drought, cyclones and locust invasions which 
have been particularly severe in the past few years (FAO 2016).20 Women farmers in the 
region are particularly vulnerable as the majority of farmland is locally recognized under 
customary tenure, which follows male lineage.21 For example, if a woman separates from her 
husband or the husband dies, and she has no male children to whom some land could be 
directed, she may have to return to her family to access land to grow food. The alternative is 
to risk severe sanctions if she tries to use his land. Women take on the post-harvest activities 
                                                          
18 HDI 2014. 
19 According to the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) Country Briefing 
(2013) the two regions Androy and Anosy were listed as having 66 and 56 per cent of the population 
in severe poverty, respectively.  
20 For a further discussion of simple commodity production as an analytic category see Friedmann 
1980; 1990. 
21 Rural women constitute 36 percent of the ag population and the female economic activity 
rate in the ag sector is about 53 percent (FAOSTAT 2016). 




associated with subsistence ‘garden’ crops and are dependent on their husband’s access to 
viable land for production.22  
Yet, the poverty and livelihood instability plaguing southern Madagascar is not necessarily 
new, as Anosy and Androy have for the better part of the twentieth century been observed by 
scholars as a ‘development backwater.’ The discursive construction of the ‘underdeveloped 
south’ was not helped by years of policies – first from the ruling highland Merina Monarchy, 
then the French, and later successive central governments – of political and economic 
marginalization of the southern Tandroy and Tanosy (and some Mahafaly) groups 
(Heurtebize 1986). Over the years this helped instil a political isolationism in the southern 
region and, throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, groups in the south 
had tried and sometimes succeeded in maintaining their independence from the Merina 
Monarchy during the process of unification. This independent streak held until the French 
took over in the early 1900s, and even then, regions of Androy where kept in an emergency 
state until 1917 due to sporadic resistance. This struggle against the French caused the 
eventual build-up of colonial forces vying for a more permanent presence in the region. Yet, 
during the colonial period, elements of defiance in the south to outside influences were 
compounded by provocative tactics of ‘divide and rule’ by the French to maintain the divide 
between many of the coastal populations and the highland Merina (Ramandimbilahatra, 
2010).23 This political resistance held up until well into the mid-twentieth century, which in 
1971 ignited in a popular uprising against the independent state (Heurtebize 1986). 
The eventual desire by the French to ‘develop the deep-south’ was based on a dual policy to 
control these unruly local populations and begin to create a reliable revenue stream from the 
                                                          
22 In these extreme cases many women find themselves as landless farmers navigating a very difficult 
livelihood of working someone else’s land or harvesting castor off refused land.   
23 In the twenty-first century, the region still remains isolated and deprived of access to education and 
training by comparison with many other parts of the country (Droy et al. 2010). 




region. In particular, the French were seeking to ‘ground’ the mobile peasant-herder 
communities found in the southern ethnic groups into discrete, administrable – and therefore 
taxable – villages (Kaufmann and Tsirahamba 2006). This strategy led to considerable social 
discord which reached a head during World War I as taxation demands to support France’s 
war efforts were rebuked by the majority of Malagasy, particularly in the south. For instance, 
in the Androy region, a local Malagasy administrator gathered a large force together and 
refused to pay taxes or provide services to the French, proposing instead to kill colonizers and 
run them out of southern Madagascar (see Gontard 1969). Nevertheless, beyond these 
insurrections, Madagascar’s colonial magistrates during the inter-war years were successful 
in implementing agricultural schemes for cash crops and forestry using French colons 
(settlers) and coerced labour (Jarosz 1996; Sodikoff 2012). It was at this time that colonial 
plantations of castor, alongside sisal, periwinkle and prickly-pear cactus (raketa), were meant 
to generate revenue from the southern regions of Anosy and Androy (Middleton 1999).24 Not 
coincidentally, these same regions are also targeted for today’s castor projects.  
Castor Production from the Colonial Period to the Present Day 
Castor is a fast-growing herbaceous evergreen or semi-woody shrub. Its distinctive palm-
shaped leaves are either glossy green or purplish red on long leaf-stems (Sanders 1896). The 
plant is regularly propagated by seed, but has the ability to self-seed and can be invasive, 
establishing itself in less-cultivated ‘wild’ areas in the deep-south and reaching up to 3 metres 
in height in just one season. It can thrive in harsh nutrient-poor and dry conditions, and 
although it prefers more fertile and moister soils, if available, these are often lacking in the 
                                                          
24 In 1769, prickly-pear cactus (Opuntia monacantha) was introduced to Madagascar for use as 
protective hedging (Kaufmann and Tsirahamba 2006). The Malagasy soon learnt to use this 
formidable defence against French armed forces patrolling throughout the south. The French were 
forced to introduce an exotic beetle, which decimated the cactus and provoked a famine in the 1930s. 
Later, colonial powers had to reintroduce cactus species as Malagasy dependence upon the plant had 
become too important for food, wind breaks and cattle fodder (Razafindrakoto 1977).  




poorer agricultural zones used for castor production in the south. In fact, the plant’s ability to 
thrive in harsh climatic conditions was very attractive to the French during the colonial period 
and one of the main reasons they chose the southern region as its primary site for 
production.25  
Castor beans are thought to have first arrived in southern Madagascar through various 
maritime trading routes with India. The first known local sub-species was R. communis var. 
minor, believed to have originally been cultivated in Hindustan, where it is often referred to 
as ‘Bombay Small Seed’ (although the species itself probably originated in north Africa). The 
dry sub-tropical conditions in Madagascar assisted the alien plant to establish (François 
1934). The oil derived from the seed has historically been used by locals to condition hair and 
provide fuel in lamps. However, global demand for castor began to increase during the 
outbreak of World War I. At this time, major strides forward were being made in aeroplane 
engine design, many of which used castor oil as a lubricant in their crankshafts. Later, in the 
1920s and 30s, blends of castor and mineral oil were very effective for car engines as well.  
Madagascar’s castor beans were first recorded in French colonial export statistics from 1920 
onwards. Prior to this date, castor production was assimilated into colonial export records for 
a diverse range of hand-collected ‘oleaginous’ seeds including baobab and native jatropha. In 
1928, France’s energy services, supplying lubricants to its Aviation, War and Maritime 
Department, encouraged national production of castor beans aligned to French colonial 
countries. At the launch in 1920, 720 tonnes were produced; this soon more than tripled to 
reach 2,500 tonnes by 1929 (François 1934), and as high as 3,300 tonnes in 1940 (Menet et 
al. 1982). 
                                                          
25 Paradoxically this still provides an opportunity for private sector and development agencies seeking 
to maximize efficiency from the southern regions’ ‘underutilized’ lands (Baka 2012). 




Castor oil for colonial needs was initially provided by local farmers collecting from relatively 
abundant plants growing semi-spontaneously near their villages. At first, the commissariat 
encouraged local farmers and intermediaries to take on the hard work of clearing land and 
establishing plots for castor. This was only the beginning of uneven trade in castor, as 
demand was anything but consistent. For example, a shortage of orders in 1933 provoked 
outrage and small skirmishes by growers looking to sell their full storehouses. Colonial 
authorities did not want the farmers to be dependent upon orders from the commissariat, but 
equally wanted to lower costs for their needs, in particular transport costs, which were viewed 
as excessive from isolated trading posts. The administration also recognized that excess 
production above their needs would necessitate absorption by the private sector and soon 
lower prices, rendering in vain the service’s initial strategy to control production and 
collection of castor beans using premium pricing tactics. 
The authorities sought to improve production in the region by removing ageing stock and 
weeding to stimulate younger plants. Despite this, parasitic losses from colonial harvests 
accounted for up to 40 per cent of entire production and reduced yields to less than 150 kg/ha. 
Meanwhile, crop damage was also often correlated with drier periods of the year, when there 
was less vegetative ground cover for pests, encouraging them to attack stands of castor plants 
(BDPA 1965). This risk of loss and eventual failure due to drought-prone conditions and 
pests has been a historical problem for many crops in the southern regions (Middleton 1999). 
Post-colonial French agricultural support for the cultivation of castor foresaw, by 1970, castor 
fields reaching 7,000 ha and producing up to 5,000 tonnes of seed per annum with the 
potential for pressing facilities (BDPA 1965). Based on highest or projected historical records 
for castor seed production, this yield represents approximately 20–30,000 ha under traditional 
cultivation, producing 400 litres of castor oil per tonne of seed (Razafindrakoto 1977). Yet 
more technical advancement in mineral and synthetic oil blends led to superior lubrication 




specifications from modern oils leading to a decline in cultivated castor fields from the 
1970s, as synthetics took precedence around the world (Menet et al. 1982).26  
Production efficiency proposals also suggested siting of oil presses in proximity to farmers in 
the south to reduce production volumes by approximately 60 per cent, thereby lowering 
transport costs and being cheaper than pressing in France. Needs for crushing machines were 
discussed again during revived castor oil development operations in the 1960s (BDPA 1965); 
however, we have found evidence of at least one colonial factory with presses operating in 
Fort Dauphin in the early 1950s (see Figure 1).27 
Figure 1 about here 
Although castor accounts for only 0.15 per cent of world vegetable oil production, it has increased by 
over 50 per cent during the past 25 years (Patel et al. 2016). Today, worldwide production of 
castor oil was reported at approximately 600,000 tonnes/year, while seed remains high, 
reported in 2014 at 1.98 million t/y, down from its highest production totals of 2.5 tonnes in 
2010 (FAOSTAT 2016) (see Figure 2). India dominates the global castor oil market with 
about 80 per cent of production (Pavaskar and Kshirsagar 2013). While Africa and the 
Americas come in a very distant second for global production, the market is growing 
(FAOSTAT 2016). One reason for this increased interest in castor and other biomass schemes 
has been the promotion of regional development through large-scale agricultural investment 
in the early 2000s to capitalize on a growing alternative energy market, and what is generally 
observed as ‘underutilized’ land and available labour (World Bank 2010). Because castor is 
                                                          
26 Seeds of colonial-era castor in the arid south of Madagascar were collected during the dry seasons 
from July to October. Although the marginally moister conditions in the eastern sector of the Androy 
region provided better climatic conditions for the plant, the drier west dominated production mainly 
due to ease of establishment in more ‘underproductive’ and refused plots. 
27 This subject has been raised for decades, although no commercial presses for oil appear to have 
been sighted in the castor-producing areas until the recent establishment of castor collection and a 
processing plant in 2008 at Tsihombe. 




grown in rural semi-arid climates, annual production varies greatly mainly because of fluctuations 
in rainfall and the area devoted to planting. 28 
Figures 2 & 3 about here 
Due to this surge in demand, peripheral areas in African countries such as Kenya, 
Mozambique and Madagascar quickly became ‘hotspots’ for biomass production (Carmody 
2011; Neimark et al. 2016). While small in terms of overall biomass production, what makes 
today’s castor production in Madagascar so relevant is that it provides a critical window into 
the effects of bringing a precarious labour force into the boom and bust cycles observed in 
both the global and Malagasy production history (see Figures 2 and 3, respectively). Once 
again we see the effects of the rhetorical and material construction of ‘value chains’ as a 
method of delivering economic development through the mobilization of a workforce and 
commoditization of frontier natures in attempts to somehow even out this regional 
development and reach those who are most marginal.  
CASTOR PRODUCTION AS AN ECOLOGICAL COMMODITY FRONTIER  
This vision of ‘regional economic development’ in the south remains alive today in part 
through the UNDP’s poverty alleviation support programme in collaboration with the 
European Community and GIZ. Claudia Maier, the GIZ project leader in charge of their 
castor operations, was quoted in The Guardian discussing the importance of castor’s 
historical trade on today’s income generation schemes:  
Madagascar was one of the biggest exporters [of castor] during the colonial era … Castor 
oil plants can cope with drought and soils with a poor mineral content. The seeds are 
                                                          
28 The spike in production in 2011 (which actually began in 2009) seemed to be caused by an 
increased demand from the European Union and China looking for a cheaper substitute to use in the 
manufacturing of industrial products and biofuels driving up prices and motivating farmers to increase 
yield to tap into an increased market share (Severino et al. 2012, 868). 




harvested in October and November, so it has the advantage of providing a source of 
income while waiting for other crops … Seventy years ago Androy was famous for its 
castor oil (van Eeckhout 2015).  
Yet, these contemporary development narratives surrounding income generation and food 
security cannot be taken out of their historical context; for many they are closely linked to 
years of historical encounters in the deep-south to source castor, and previous discourses to 
‘develop the south’ through the colonial/post-colonial oil trade resonate closely with recent 
interventions to encourage production and participation in global value chains (Marley 2016; 
Mintz 1985; Moore 2000). Therefore this study exposes the complexity of seeing the 
bioeconomy as a ‘new’ market-based instrument and its not-so-neat alignment with the cycles 
or temporal patterns (origins, development and crisis/exhaustion) observed in other 
commodity frontier studies (Marley 2016). One can certainly say the ‘bioeconomy’ is a win-
win’ development trope for ‘income generation’ and a way to confront the global carbon-
constrained economy − a pattern emerging throughout the global south as new bioeconomy 
frontiers are observed from Indonesia to Brazil. In reality, castor production is in many ways 
only a reinvention of previous interventions which seek to develop the south through the 
widening and deepening of market relations.  
Financial and technical support for the construction of the firm’s pressing factory in 
Tsihombe, provided by development agencies such as the European Community and GIZ, is 
a case in point (see Figure 4). This new factory was equipped with cold-pressing machines, 
filtering technology, drums and packaging materials, all purchased though subsidized 
development funds.29 This ‘upgrading,’ of processing capacity, designed under the value-
chain umbrella, according to the firm’s manager, is meant to deliver jobs and provide added-
                                                          
29 Note this does not fit the standard definitions of upgrading, nor is it the replacement of new 
versions of similar products, since the pressing factory did not exist before the company began in 
2009. Currently, they produce approximately 100,000 litres of castor oil per year. 




value ‘in country’ through semi-processing of the castor oil in Madagascar rather than export 
as grains.30 The pressing factory only employs about 15 people, but development agencies 
argue that it extends the processing capacity and therefore added value can reach thousands 
of small-scale harvesters in an area with little else (see earlier Figure 2). This is noted in a 
laudatory description by the project funder of how the castor pressing factory will help ‘… 
generate[s] higher incomes from increased production volume and better product quality’ 
(GIZ 2014). Yet, as we see below, it also justifies extending and intensifying production as 
the increasing capacity of the pressing factory makes it feasible to widen the catchment area 
and increase wild collection of castor and the unpaid labour to transport it. 
Figure 4 about here 
 
Development agencies themselves are central to the structure which can deliver what they 
refer to as ‘innovative (appropriate) technologies and value-chain upgrading’, but are also 
involved in developing local land governance in the form of property rights and taxation, 
organizing collection associations and mobilizing local labour (Moore 2015, 158). The new 
organizational forms or what Araghi calls ‘revolutions’ fuse together ‘territorial and capitalist 
organization with technical innovation’ (Moore 2015, 160) which can help extend cycles of 
capitalist accumulation across time and space. This is not just a technical revolution, 
however, but a spatial and social expansion into deep-southern outgrowing regions which 
through years of economic and political marginalization are primed for continued 
accumulation.31 
                                                          
30 Interview with regional manager [7 July 2014]. 
31 There were no women reported to be working at the pressing factory. 




Regions in the central massif and western savannahs of the island have observed large-scale 
agribusiness investments over the past 10 years (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011). 32 
Yet, beyond castor, the deep-south has been relatively quiet: this seemingly innovative 
project stands out. There were some bioeconomy-based start-up firms which were originally 
connected with larger agribusiness; however, many have since shut down in the south, mainly 
due to a drop in global demand and lack of production. Also, because of the difficult drought-
prone conditions, risk of pests, and poor soils, most agribusinesses see investment into larger 
plantations in the south as too risky, opting for more risk-averse strategies, such as outgrower 
schemes, which need much less start-up capital.  
There are a number of reasons why the firm chose to use outgrowers over plantations.33 First, 
according to the firm it is extremely expensive and time-consuming to acquire official land 
titles for plantations, particularly in the south. This was further explained to us by Giles, the 
head of a civil-society group who set up the original castor deal with the UNDP: 
Some of the investors went alone to discuss with the mayor how to make a deal for 100 
or 500 ha in their communes, while others contacted the chief of the region. So each 
investor has their own approach … And the problem is that when the investor starts to 
exploit the land, they have [land] problems with the community. And it’s a very big risk 
for their investment … [The firm] may have a certificate for this space, but the 
community won’t accept that they have rights there. And when the investor begins their 
activities, the community may try to fight against the firm... 
The land is generally governed by a host of formal state claims overlapping with layers of 
unrecognized customary claims based on lineage (Raison-Jourde 1991); and as noted by 
                                                          
32 For more on property rights and land deals in Madagascar see Neimark (2016). 
33 According to the firm operators, they are the only sizeable castor oil production system exporting 
off the island of Madagascar. As noted, they only use outgrowers.  




Giles, without secure and state-recognized land titles, investors run the risk of sabotage and 
organized resistance from rural inhabitants. Again, this is something firms are actively 
seeking to avoid in a ‘post-land grabbing’ environment. 
Second, castor is found across an extensive area where regional road infrastructure is very 
poor; the outgrower labour force can both access the very remote areas and transport castor 
back. In order to access the castor, the firm needs to negotiate road taxes with local officials, 
providing freedom of movement in the region. As noted by Robert, the head of a 
development NGO which helped negotiate the deal: ‘The head of the region saw that there 
would be this firm in the region, and this firm needed to use the road to transport the product. 
Yet, he must pay tax … but this is negotiable, because the price of the road tax depends on 
many factors, and there is little justification on how much it should be … so he made up a 
number.’ Road taxes are set as part of the redevance, or return tax back to the regions. More 
generally, they are not ‘separated out’ and negotiated by individuals, but set at a fixed rate at 
the Ministerial level depending on the type of commodity. Yet, this ‘tax break’ negotiated on 
behalf of the firm is an example of the extent to which many of the barriers of market-based 
development are removed, sometimes to allow capital to reach the most marginal and 
inaccessible areas. 
Third, by contracting smallholders to collect and grow castor, the firm circumvents the need 
to pay wages or provide any social benefits (health benefits or social security) usually 
demanded by plantation workers in Madagascar. This allows for limited capitalization as the 
firm only needs to invest in the most minimal of inputs (such as new varieties, seeds and 
storage sheds) in order to maintain its current collectors and entice new groups of growers. 
These alongside other ‘hidden’ costs, such as risks associated with the crop failure due to 
pests and disease which are a common occurrence with smallholders in Madagascar (Harvey 
et al. 2014) are now taken on by the household (Bernstein 1986). Friedmann (1990) and 




others (Moore 2015) argue that this is inherently ‘patriarchal’ since household reproduction 
costs are mainly covered by women. 
On a related point, the use of outgrowers fits neatly into the value-chain scheme: the more 
collectors of the plant, the more target numbers, including women who are integrated into the 
project, as according to the NGO ‘households managed by women were to be integrated into 
the relevant value chains’ (GIZ 2014). In order to recruit labour, development agencies set up 
a ‘food-for-work’ scheme called a ‘High-Intensive Labour’ public works programme 
(HIMO).34 Developed by the World Food Programme (WFP), Malagasy who participated in 
this scheme worked in selected projects and were paid either with food disbursements or 
cash. Workers in the HIMO cleared land for new test plots of castor throughout the region 
mainly because, according to Robert, ‘…that’s what the development donors wanted to fund’: 
Robert: The analyses showed us that it is the donors who decide ‘we will do this, we will 
finance this’. Government and the national authorities will say that we need your money 
to do this activity, but in the end it’s always the donors who get to decide what to fund. 
Interviewer: So it’s the donor who is defining what the money is for? 
Robert: Yes, and it’s usually the regional or the national co-ordinators who are accepting 
without really much negotiation because in the south there is a lot of potential. The new 
port is not far, and there is a lot of land to exploit. It all depends on the donor and on 
who you work with. 
This is just one of the many historical examples of regional development agencies mobilizing 
rural labour into castor schemes. Yet, the justification of recent labour mobilisation rests on 
the promises (and perils) of humanitarian work for food security and income generation. It 
                                                          
34 Haute Intensité de Main d’Oeuvre or HIMO has, over the years, raised serious concern and 
contestation between humanitarian development agencies and local NGOs. Locals organizations claim 
that the WFP often accepts what it can get from its international supporters (e.g. foreign grain) even if 
that could destabilize local food production prices. 




wasn’t very long ago that these HIMO programmes were re-packaged under the castor value 
chains. Placing humanitarian aid as an enticement for new investment schemes is an example 
of new organizational forms which assist in extending accumulation to include the southern 
region’s most marginal workers. Castor production is therefore widened and extended 
through a bundle of agency networks and donor-funded projects and discourses of added 
benefits, value chains and upgrading. These ‘upgrades’, however, are mainly concentrated at 
the level of the firm; in contrast, new technology and skills ‘halt at the farm gate’, with costs 
(and risks) of production taken on by harvesters whose benefits, as we will see below, are 
meagre at best, yet whose risk remains high (Mann and Dickinson 1978).  
WIDENING COMMODITY RELATIONS: RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION OF A 
PRECARIOUS LABOUR FORCE  
Castor is mainly found growing wild and in semi-managed small-scale plots over a large 
range of the southern regions of Anosy and Androy. This stretches from Ambosary in the east 
to the western towns of Marolinta, and from just north of Tsihombe to the southern coastal 
village of Faux Cap (see Figure 5). One reason for this wide range into semi-wild areas is 
because of the plant’s ability to disperse its seeds and easily establish in the dry scrubland of 
some of the more marginal farming zones. Sometimes castor is kept in fallow rotations 
because locally it is believed that it can help deter some insects from eating other staple crops 
and keep soil from eroding in degraded areas. While whole families prepare the fields for 
planting, women usually harvest and dry seeds in September and October. After drying, 
castor beans are stored temporarily in ‘drop-off’ collection kiosks near or close to the main 
transport road until they can be picked up by the firm. Each collection kiosk can hold 5–10 
tonnes of beans and harvesters will transport the seeds in gunny sacks on their backs (less 
than 10 kg), in locally made wheelbarrows (less than 30 kg), or using ox-drawn carts (over 30 
kg). 




Put Figure 5 (map) here 
It is up to the firm to navigate the tricky logistics of bad roads and widely dispersed kiosks to 
pick up the castor seeds and bring them back to the pressing factory just outside the centrally 
located town of Tsihombe. The closest drop-off point to Tsihombe is roughly 25 km, and the 
furthest, 110 km. From the pressing factory, the commodity chain is fairly simple. The beans 
are pressed and the semi-processed oils transported in containers to the Ehoala Port in Fort 
Dauphin.35 The oil is then exported to European buyers who purchase it in bulk for the 
manufacturing of bioplastics, biofuels and the cosmetics industry.36  
The castor seed is sown from March to May. An individual harvester’s labour availability is a 
crucial factor in whether or not they will decide to take part in castor production. Although 
both men and women are encouraged to take part, female collectors are targeted as vital 
actors in the value chain due to their experience in growing and using castor as hair 
conditioner, but also for ‘visibility’ as development agencies often want to highlight their 
attention to improving gender equality.37 Many of the labour dynamics also play out along 
these distinct gender lines. Men have the ability to be away all day from the village and have 
access to different forms of transport, whereas many women do not have either the time or 
the access to transport to collect enough to make it worth their while. This is especially the 
case if women do not have a zebu cart and need to rent one, cutting into their profit margin.38 
This was noted by a female harvester who had to collect and carry her own castor to market: 
‘We get paid in weight, so for example a standard gunny sack [women can carry half a full 
                                                          
35 Funded as a joint venture by the Malagasy state and the mining giant Rio Tinto QMM, the port is 
estimated to cost roughly US $275 million. See http://www.ehoalaport.com/ [accessed on 15 March 
2016]. 
36 Interview with regional manager [7 July 2014]. 
37 Specific methods used by the firm to bring women into the ‘value chain’ were not elaborated on 
when asked about and little data exists in the project documents as to how women are targeted as 
benefit recipients of castor production.  
38 Zebu is the Malagasy name for locally known breeds of cattle.  




sack] filled with rice is not the same weight for the bio-oil seeds. We need to work a lot [as 
compared to rice], but it is not enough weight. It’s not enough money in the end. Although 
we work a lot to get many seeds, it’s still not enough because the yield doesn’t have much 
weight.’ Farmers’ labour is embedded in the transport for which they are not compensated. 
For the firm, there is a distinct advantage to building drop-off points as it does not have to 
pay the extra cost of transport to get to the harvesters’ villages to pick up the beans; instead 
the growers have to transport the seeds themselves. There are roughly 29 drop-off points 
along the main transport routes in the region, with plans to add another 25 points in 2014. 
Each drop-off point is fed by roughly 300–350 collectors. On average, within a catchment 
area, collectors will travel a minimum of 3 km and sometimes up to 7 km to collect the seeds 
and bring them back to their village or to transport them directly to drop-off sites. However, 
individual harvesters do not get paid to transport castor as distance travelled is not reflected 
in the final price paid by the firm. Harvesters are therefore subsidizing the transport costs, 
causing many to question their participation, so vital for the firm’s ability to mobilize a 
labour force. Without management restructuring allowing this labour to be recruited from 
within, the firm would be unable to keep a continual flow without the voluntary will of the 
harvesters to transport the crop. As Giles, the head of the NGO start-up project, notes: 
Madagascar really needs these projects, this investment, to develop the country. But you 
have to have good management. For example, in each project you have to do some study 
… to see what the reality is in the field, and how to adapt our actions or our activity with 
this reality … I think that everyone, international level, national, local level, want 
investment in Madagascar. But, you have only to put in place a standard rule for each 
investor who wants to invest in Madagascar, because I think each investor needs land, 
needs a good relationship with the community, with authorities, with everyone. 




Here we can see the organizational forms of the commodity frontier develop and manifest. 
The firm’s relationships with different actors along the castor commodity chain differs 
depending on its maintenance of an expanding network of local elites, many of whom are the 
head of the village (Fokontany), and act as collection managers or village leaders of ‘new 
growers’ associations’. The intermediaries organize the associations, which in turn help to 
organize harvesters in the village. Not everyone wants to participate in castor production or 
has the means to do so even if they did want to. It was noted by one intermediary that he had 
no interest in participating, and as for many others it brought back memories of the colonial 
production systems in which his recent ancestors had been involved. He called castor 
‘…another vazaha [foreigner in Malagasy] crop.’39  
The fact that this was not a ‘home-grown’ idea was a theme that came up quite often in our 
interviews, and some in the villages noted a particular schism between those who felt that 
they should keep to ‘traditional’ farming ways and those who embraced the new. Others 
noted that introducing foreign crops went along with other intrusions into their cultural 
customs, which they attached to foreign development. This was made clear by one of the 
association heads: 
Traditions like the being discrete about cattle ownership, or to go to the ombiasy 
[traditional healer] to use plants to ward off diseases. It’s our half of the village not in 
the association which keeps the tradition. We don’t follow the vazaha traditions. The oil 
plants are not traditional … it is a tradition of the vazaha. But many plant it now. It’s 
the FAO that made us plant it for the food for work programme. For those of us who 
don’t have work or food. They made us plant it.40  
                                                          
39 Anon [4 July 2012]. In all of the village associations, we did not observe any headed by a woman.  
40 Anon [13 July 2014]. 




While this initial resistance to participating in castor production could easily be seen as a sign 
of what we term casual traditionalism or perceived resistance to new methods of farming, a 
more critical view suggests that this is also a calculated position against getting ‘tied up’ once 
again in the risks of yet another vazaha crop. One villager, a small grower of castor, 
expressed their thoughts on perceptions of the project: ‘…this is not a bottom-up idea … they 
gave us the idea, the “bio-oil people”, they told us this proposal and we just did it as we were 
told it would work.’ This sentiment expressed by a few informants is understandable given 
that many remember quite well the mixed history of imposed cropping boom and bust cycles 
tied to global commodity fluctuations, while other castor varieties not adapted to local 
environmental conditions eventually led to crop failure and losses due to pest damage (see 
below on commodity deepening), not to mention its colonial ties to the past (see Middleton 
1999). 41  
Although not a feature in all villages, the associations which are meant to overcome these 
historical tensions also exacerbate inequalities, as association heads (often selected through 
social status and level of education) often get access to the benefits. They also play an 
important role in establishing work contracts as most of the information from the company is 
passed through them. It is through these associations that the firm communicates production 
quotas and delivery dates. While written contracts are rare, the head of the association usually 
formalizes agreements between local participants and the firm. These agreements are meant 
to be based on ‘quantitative commitments’ and help in locking in a base of growers who 
would be guaranteed a set price for their castor (Gibert 2014; Richer 2015). In return for their 
formal agreements and in attempts to lure more into joining, some harvesters are given 
                                                          
41 A major ecological concern for the firm is moisture content and rot. Therefore there is a lot of 
training directed at the heads of the association in drying techniques and post-harvest handling so that 
the seeds can be properly spread out and turned correctly, shielding them against moisture build-up 
prior to transport.  




improved and new hybrid seed varieties, cash advances in the form of loans, and training 
courses and technical assistance on effective agricultural techniques (Gibert 2014).  
It was reported to us that one of the regions included up to 30 associations, and there were 
three within one village alone, with some more on the horizon as recruitment strategies begin 
to take hold. One such strategy is the gifting of material incentives for top producers, who 
generally tend to be association heads. As one grower noted, ‘the one who produces first gets 
a plough or wheelbarrow, those who get the highest yield, like when you get 500 or 600 kilos, 
you get that as a gift….’ This method of ‘gifting’ is also a throwback to the colonial period, 
when top harvesters were given extra seeds and other benefits to increase production. 
Nonetheless, the firm’s internal recruitment methods seem to be working, as recent firm 
estimates place up to 6,000 individual producers taking part.  
The structure and make-up of the growers’ associations are organized by the head of the 
village42: the way restructuring takes place is actually based on the earlier colonial 
commodity chains of castor and other outgrower schemes described above. A village leader 
sets up an association to organize and manage the labour force. In some villages the 
association governance has a secretary who holds and disperses the money, while in others 
they may invest in micro-projects around the village or in food or other cash crops; however, 
money is mainly filtered through the association and given directly to farmers with a little bit 
held back for administration costs.  
The assignment of the association heads and the associations was noted by farmers as being 
based on already-established contacts, many of them with family members or close friends 
and kin-networks. Although many of the associations were still new at the time that we 
conducted the surveys, there was certainly a distinctive class of farmers emerging. Results 
                                                          
42 Usually always a village male. 




also showed that adoption of castor was mostly found to be by ‘better-off’ extended family 
networks. For example, we found that 39 per cent of those growing castor had access to 
primary education. In contrast, only 23 per cent of non-harvesters had access to primary 
education. The adopters were also found to have fewer periods without food and a majority 
were primary owners of zebu as compared to those who did not adopt castor.43 Early 
indications show an uneven dynamic in which historic patron–client relations observed 
during colonial and post-colonial periods seem to be repeating themselves and where 
differential treatment may be afforded to those who are already better off. While it was 
difficult to see major class differentiation developing between harvesters, it does seem that 
wealthier and more-progressive farmers − many of whom have had experience working with 
the project and other NGO-sponsored projects in the past and have the finances and capacity 
to take on castor − will also to be the ones who are the early beneficiaries. Yet, if anything, as 
the project expands and intensifies, early indications do point to the potential to exacerbate 
structural gender inequalities that already exist. 
By far the most important task of the head is to keep production flowing in the most out of 
reach areas and control the numbers of producers dropping out. In those which are not 
accessible by road, seeds and other materials are trucked-in. However, this is not the job of 
the firm alone as significant support is provided by local mayors. When asked where the 
seeds were coming from, one farmer responded, ‘…they get it from the mayor. There is a car 
coming bringing it here which arrives from the factory in Tsihombe.’ Castor production is not 
a small operation and within the first few years of production, the firm, together with EU 
assistance, delivered over 12 tons of seed and invested over 22 million Ariary (US $6,700). 
Bags of seed were marked and handed out to willing farmers who registered to participate in 
                                                          
43 Primary ownership of zebu is a distinctive marker of family wealth in southern Madagascar, 
although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain as it is a particularly sensitive subject. It was 
explained to us that asking someone how many cattle they own is similar to asking a neighbour how 
much money they have in the bank. 




the first seed trials.44 Positive responses to this early production were expressed: ‘…because 
when there is good production, we get good money. We know that it is positive for us.’ This 
is a lifeline for some during periods of drought: ‘As you know there is drought here, no rain. 
So that plant is something that can survive here. Because in general things don’t grow here, 
as you know when there is no rain we starve. When there is a drought, they get money from 
the ricin.’45 Again, this is based on experiments with plants harvested repeatedly from the 
same wild progenitors that were grown during the colonial periods. 
For the donors, a key factor in supporting these associations was to organize the labour force, 
professionalizing them to a new rural landscape influenced by private sector opportunities 
(Neimark 2016). Feedback on harvest and collection could be transferred and in return the 
producers could pick up new growing techniques, varieties of seed and, most importantly, 
how payments would be distributed. As noted by Leon, who heads up an NGO which helped 
broker the castor deal for the firm agreements:  
In one association… there is a leader. We don’t have the money, or the means, to help 
everyone, every member. But we can give only, for example, 10 kg of seeds, for the 
association and it’s the turn of the association to decide how to distribute … sort of 
greases the wheels of production. This way it’s very easy to organize and professionalize 
them and give technical support of the producer and the association.  
In some villages associations can run up to 240 families. Yet rather than diversifying, it 
seems that some of these families are devoting their whole plots to castor as it is the only way 
of making the extra work worth it, as noted by a local grower: ‘…before I mixed ricin with 
other crops but now I have decided to grow only castor because it returns more’ . Even with 
                                                          
44 In these early years, roughly 100 tonnes of seed were purchased by the firm and given out to 
farmers. The firm got a return rate of 40 per cent in oil. In optimal conditions, castor can return up to 
200 litres ha/year. 
45 Anon [4 July 2014]. 




this, there remains increasing tension concerning the benefits the harvesters receive for their 
labour. The firm keeps the prices they pay to the harvesters low so as to offset their transport 
costs from the drop-off points; at the same time, these prices must be high enough to maintain 
harvesters’ interest. The firm is under increasing pressure to increase both yields and numbers 
of farmers, so as to offset the low prices they pay and those dropping out.  
DEEPENING COMMODITY RELATIONS: PERCEPTIONS OF PAY AND EXTRA- 
HUMAN LABOUR  
While the project promotes market access and income generation for some of the most 
precarious farmers in Madagascar, the irony is that rather than being liberated, many seem 
ambivalent to its benefits at best and others are distraught. The main point of contention is 
pay. Farmers expressed a willingness to travel longer distances and transport castor, but 
emphasized that the pay had to match the labour involved. Among all of the critiques 
surrounding the project, the price of castor was the most frequent issue raised, especially by 
women who felt that hauling the castor took too much time.  
This complicates the harvesters’ relationship with the firm. Many agree that having the 
opportunity for some added income is vital, particularly during the lean months. As noted by 
one female collector: ‘the good part is that it brings some money at least – to buy a bit of 
food, medicine for children.’ Prices per kilogram of castor are set by the firm mainly based 
on the price given to them at the port. Since castor is sold to much larger international buyers 
as semi-processed oil, the firm managers argue that it has very little control over the price it 
pays to the harvesters and is also therefore at the mercy of the ‘whims of global commodity 
fluxes’.  
Yet for many of the female collectors, this is where support for the project ends, as their time 
devoted to transport begins to take away responsibility from household responsibilities (e.g. 




taking care of children, working in household gardens and cooking). For example, we 
observed whole families harvesting castor (see Figure 6). Simultaneously, we observed some 
women carrying babies or tending to small children during the work while also trying their 
best to keep up the demand for castor which needed to be ready for the long transport to the 
drop-off points. Adopting feminist political ecology approach, Schroeder (1999, 74) found 
that women horticultural gardeners in The Gambia would schedule their work regimes around 
household domestic duties, sometimes doing daily ‘double-visits’, demonstrating how 
women ‘highly calibrated their work regimes to simultaneously address the social and 
ecological constraints they faced on a daily basis’ (1999, 76). 46 Moore’s concept of 
work/energy is instructive here as it helps us understand how women’s socially necessary 
labour time is valued and thereby increasingly capitalized under the bioeconomy (2016, 15).  
Figure 6 about here 
Following Moore here, this commodity deepening or capitalization includes the shift from 
their subsistence livelihoods growing cassava and maize to intensive ‘petty commodity 
production’ and livelihood integration in global political economic networks (Bernstein 
2010). This includes an increase in the use of new castor varieties and faming inputs, such as 
fertilisers, to keep up production quotas. For many, this dependency on single crop 
production has had the perverse effect of increasing their vulnerability to crop failure, mainly 
due to pests and cyclic drought and cyclone-induced flooding, which historically they were 
able to hedge when growing a more diversified array of crops. For instance, the 2012 cyclone 
which hit southern Madagascar caused flooding damage to irrigated rice fields. Afterwards, 
there was a widespread infestation of locusts further damaging whatever crops were left 
(FAO 2013). This string of hazards continues to weigh heavily on the minds of farmers who 
are already contending with having to travel further into the fields to gather enough ‘wild’ 
                                                          
46 See Schroeder (1999) for an excellent example of extra labour that women took on in development-promoted 
horticulture gardens in The Gambia.  




castor and being pushed by the firm to intensify production to make it worthwhile. However, 
it may not be long before some will not have the choice; as more of their land is converted to 
castor they may reach a point where they are too entrenched in production to navigate a way 
out (Schroeder 1999; Watts 1994).   
Yet, still at these early stages, we observed that even the most marginal growers will make 
rational wage calculations based on benefits and opportunity costs. As Arni, the head of one 
of the castor associations noted about risk and price calculations farmers make: ‘They [the 
growers] are not happy about the price. The firm wants to get more villagers involved but 
with the price so low, it’s hard to get. They don’t want to do it. There is not enough money in 
it, they say. Those who are interested are those who get money out of it. For them, it’s not the 
work keeping them away, it’s the price.’ 
While some villages that are close to the drop-off points are pulling in 500 tons and 
surpassing their goals, many more are dropping out. This is a worrisome sign for the firm, 
resulting in it concentrating on expansion and intensification of the catchment areas to 
include wild castor. The ‘wilder’ the castor harvested the longer they generally need to 
transport it. Because of this, women harvesters usually had a more critical view of the firm 
than men. As one woman, Ambrosa, interjected during an interview with both her and her 
husband Nari: 
Interviewer: Are you happy about the existence of this association here? I mean the firm 
here.  
Nari: Yes, it’s okay.  
Interviewer: What are the positive things that make you say it is okay for you? 
Nari: Because when there is good production, we get good money. We know that it is 
positive for us.  




Ambrossa: But we are not happy about the price! 
Interviewer: Who fixes the price, the firm or the association?  
Ambrossa: The firm. They fix it, and we can do nothing! 
Another woman commented:  
The price of the firm is too low. The price per kilo is 200 Ar and they tried to increase it to 
400 Ar. Overall, the production is good for the population because they increase their 
revenue. But the problem is the price as compared to how much work is involved. Some 
collectors spend all day on collection and transport. They will leave in the morning and 
not return till the evening 12 hours later. The whole family will go, including children.  
It is generally understandable why pricing remains a contentious issue. Given the 
precariousness of the harvesters and particularly that of women who do not hold customary 
rights to land, one might say that the difference between 200 and 400 Ar could mean the 
difference between making it through the ‘leanest’ periods of the year. For instance, out of 
120 harvesters we conducted surveys with, 31 mentioned that in the past 5 years they had 
increasingly ‘more frequent occurrences without any food at all’. This represents roughly 26 
per cent of all the harvesters questioned. Out of 55 people surveyed who did not participate in 
castor, only 16 had ‘periods without food’, this representing 29 per cent of the non-growers 
group. This means that neither growers nor non-growers of castor could achieve food 
security, clearly showing that the firm is underperforming in its stated development goal of 
overcoming periods of food shortage.  
However, overall 66 per cent of harvesters said that the firm had not significantly contributed 
to their income since castor harvesting began, whereas only 15 per cent said that it had. 
Almost twice as many of the respondents who said their income had ‘got worse’ since castor 
production began were women. Apart from the money they receive or still think may come 




their way due to the firm’s presence, many people identified other benefits they would like to 
see; 89 per cent identified better road conditions and transport, while 36 per cent said that 
they would like to negotiate some improved access to clean water. Thirty-three per cent of 
growers mentioned that they now have access to improved health, but only 25 per cent said 
that the firm was actually sympathetic to their needs. In the end, very little if any of these 
development services are part of the social contract of the firm or the associated development 
project devised by the agencies involved.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to expand the theoretical framing of commodity frontiers through 
empirical contours of the bioeconomy crop castor in the deep-south of Madagascar. The 
paper engages with the socio-ecological and material relations bound up in the value chain of 
castor and its promotion of economic development for some of the most precarious rural 
inhabitants in Madagascar. According to its proponents, the bioeconomy is a solution for 
addressing ecological, economic and societal challenges through a transition from traditional 
‘dirty’ carbon-heavy resource extraction towards sustainable knowledge-based innovations in 
biotechnology. Yet, discoveries have, up to this point, failed to meet many of these lofty 
goals, and as such, the industry must continually expand to new areas and intensify biomass 
production (Borras and Franco 2011; White et al. 2012).  
Taking a cue from Hughes (2011) mentioned earlier, we recognize the framing of the 
bioeconomy as a commodity frontier as part of a political project. It builds on, and moves 
beyond, the concept of commodity frontiers which is mainly centred within world 
ecology/systems thinking, to use in conjunction with regional and feminist political ecology. 
For our work, it simultaneously ‘demarcates and opens up’ empirical understandings of 
socio-ecological representations of agrarian change and better identifies how bundles of 




human and extra-human nature are ‘refracted through particular historical-geographical 
formations’ (Moore 2015, 38). The bioeconomy constitutes a socio-ecological frontier in that 
it effectively opens up nature and labour through commodity widening and deepening 
(Campling 2012). However, we are careful not to see these frontiers as abstract geographical 
spaces; on the contrary, we look at the discursive constructions of small-scale bioeconomy 
value chains by development agencies and the private sector, and the consequences of this 
framing within regional and feminist political ecologies and/or the distinctiveness of location-
based geo-historical settings (Harcourt and Nelson 2015; Schroeder 1999). Here we 
demonstrate that it is actually the latent or ‘veiled’ dispossession observed over years of 
marginalization which helps provide the backdrop for continued accumulation (Kelly 2011). 
In doing so, our study of the castor value chain helps scholars critically reflect on larger 
trends in sourcing the global south for biomass for new natural products and mobilizing of 
labour, bound up in larger discursive imaginaries of climate change adaptation and 
mitigation, poverty reduction and food security.  
For instance, the use of value chains as a model for economic development assists in the 
justification for funding and materials needed to recruit labour. For the firm charged with 
sourcing castor oil, local outgrower recruitment remains a high priority. The more rural 
inhabitants they can get within the value chain, the lower the prices paid to individuals can 
remain while still touting large participation numbers. The larger numbers of rural workers 
help the firm overcome the challenge of transporting over geographically dispersed wild and 
semi-managed plots spread out over vast and in some cases very inaccessible areas 
throughout Anosy and Androy. More generally, harvesters have very few options. As such, 
many will continue to harvest castor even as the price they receive remains low, committing 
to participation even if it means self-exploitation (Watts 1994). Small-scale growers will take 
on the extra labour of transporting the material, thereby subsidizing the firm and any other 




extra risks of production (pests, disease and crop failure due to drought). Here, not only does 
bioeconomy facilitate widening and deepening but also exacerbates gender-based livelihood 
‘narrowing and shallowing’ as their options become more limited through project 
involvement.47 
 
These ecological agrarian questions are very relevant for scholarship looking at how benefits 
along the value chain break down distinctly along gender lines. While women are targeted 
with producing castor, results show they have less labour availability and less access to 
transport to get the product to the drop-off points; very few have access to their own land or 
management responsibility for the household finances, and they only have a marginal role in 
leading the grower associations or capturing monetary benefits. If anything, significant 
gender-equity questions concerning the socio-economic and environmental benefits and 
burdens of the wider bioeconomy need continual attention as most analytic frameworks 
continue to read inequality only through a myopic lens on differentiation through class 
(Harcourt and Nelson 2015). And while there are already a host of critical voices emerging 
from activists and civil society, some of whom are calling for more community-led 
transitions, integrated bottom-up strategies and ethical ‘socio-ecological transformations’ 
(Temper and Del Bene 2016), others are looking for more ‘radical futures’ (including 
multiple ontological meanings), some of which may be better positioned to address gender 
(Collard et al. 2015). Hopefully this work can help open up new frameworks for analyzing 
how commodity frontier formation develops unevenly and lacks equality in specific places of 
intervention.  
                                                          
47 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for these insightful terms and help in better framing 
these dynamics under a feminist lens.  




Moving forward, this study should help proponents of the bioeconomy, who may think that 
value chains of higher-return products derived from biomass in lower quantities (e.g. natural 
products), and their uncritical framing in development discourse, is of particular concern. Our 
contribution moreover is to provide a regional political ecological lens to already rich 
rigorous analytical and empirical work on commodity frontiers. We hope that future work 
will consider drawing on this research from an array of sub-fields in geography, development 
economics and other related disciplines. 
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